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Abstract: Social and economic inequalities can influence both the distribution of the
costs and benefits from environmental degradation and the extent of environmental
protection. When those who benefit from environmentally degrading economic activities
are powerful relative to those who bear the costs, environmental protection is generally
weaker than when the reverse is true. This can lead to environmental inequalities along
lines of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and age. At the same time, inequalities may affect
the overall extent of environmental quality. There are good theoretical reasons to expect
inequalities to reduce environmental protection and exacerbate environmental
degradation. The available empirical evidence generally is consistent with this
expectation.
______________________________________________________

1. Introduction
Inequalities of power and wealth may affect the magnitude as well as the incidence of
environmental protection. A growing body of literature documents that social and
economic inequalities – based on class, race, ethnicity, gender, and age – often translate
into environmental inequalities. This essay suggests that the impact of inequalities affect
not only how environmental quality is distributed, but also the total size of the pie.
The global environment is our common home, but not everyone lives in the same room.
Clearly, many crucial dimensions of environmental quality are not private goods,
exchanged in markets where the rich can buy more than the poor. But neither are they
pure public goods, that when available to one person are equally available to all. Rather,
many aspects of environmental quality lie in the intermediate terrain between the public
and the private, a terrain where, in George Orwell’s haunting phrase, some are “more
equal than others.”
Social and economic inequalities take many forms.1 This essay focuses primarily on
inequalities of power, and secondarily on inequalities of income. Data on income
distribution are fairly widely available.2 Data on power distribution, by contrast, are by
and large non-existent; hence proxies must be used to measure this dimension of
inequality.
I first consider why, in theory, we can expect inequalities to have an impact on
environmental protection. Section 2 discusses power and its role in social decisions
regarding the environment. Section 3 formalizes this impact via a “power-weighted social
decision rule,” and advances two hypotheses: first, that social decisions on environmental
protection will systematically favor some individuals and groups over others; and second,
that a more unequal distribution of power will generally result in less environmental
1
2

For discussion, see Sen (1992).

In some respects, wealth distribution provides a more robust measure of economic inequality, but data on
wealth are far less common.
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protection and more environmental degradation. Section 4 considers the effects of income
distribution on environmental quality, and explains why the usual assumption that higherincome individuals have higher demand for environmental quality does not necessarily
imply that a redistribution of income in their favor (that is, greater income inequality)
will lead to better environmental quality.
I then turn to the empirical evidence. Section 5 reviews the burgeoning literature on
environmental injustice in the United States, highlighting several key areas of ongoing
debate. Section 6 summarizes a state-level analysis of the impact of power inequality on
the extent of environmental protection and environmental quality in the United States.
Section 7 reviews international evidence on the effects of inequality on environmental
quality, drawing on recent literature on the “environmental Kuznets curve.” Section 8
concludes by suggesting some potentially fruitful avenues for further research.
2. Power and the Environment
In analyzing environmental degradation, we can ask three basic questions:
•

First, who benefits from economic activities that degrade the environment? If there
were no winners – people who derive net benefits from these activities (or at least
expect to do so) – the environmental degradation would not take place.

•

Second, who bears the costs of environmental degradation? If there were no losers
– people on the receiving end of “negative externalities” – there would be no need
to worry about these activities, at least from the standpoint of human well-being.

•

Finally, why are the winners able to impose environmental costs on the losers?

There are three possible answers to the final question. The first is that the losers do not
yet exist; that is, they belong to future generations who are not here to defend themselves.
The second possibility is that the losers exist but lack information about the costs that the
winners are imposing on them; even if they are aware of the costs – for example, they
may see that their children are ill – they have not traced these costs to the activities of the
winners. The third possibility is that the losers exist and know that the winners are
imposing costs on them, but they lack the power to prevent this imposition.
In the first scenario – where the losers do not yet exist – environmental protection
requires that the present generation embrace an ethic of responsibility toward future
generations. In the second scenario – where the losers lack information – environmental
education and right-to-know legislation can help to tip the scales in favor of
environmental protection.3 In the third scenario – where the losers lack power relative to

3

For discussions of right-to-know legislation in the United States and its impact on environmental
protection, see Rich et al. (1993), Konar and Cohen (1995), and Khanna et al. (1998).
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the winners – environmental protection requires a change in the balance of power. This
third scenario is the main focus of this essay.
Dimensions of power
Five dimensions of power affect social decisions on environmental protection:
•

Purchasing power: If environmental protection were a simple commodity, like
orange juice, that could be bought and sold in the market, then purchasing power
would be a key determinant of the extent of environmental protection. Inequalities
of power would mirror inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. The
preferences of different individuals would influence social decisions insofar as
they are backed by ability to pay; in effect, one dollar would buy one vote.
Although environmental protection in practice has a substantial “public good”
component, shifting many decisions from the market to the arena of public policy,
this does not mean that purchasing power is entirely irrelevant to these decisions.

•

Decision power: When different people prefer different public policy outcomes,
those who prevail are said to wield “decision power.” If the extent of environmental
protection were determined by simple majority rule, each individual’s preferences
would count equally – one person, one vote – with the outcomes mirroring the
preferences of the median voter. In practice, as every political lobbyist knows, some
people wield greater decision power than others.

•

Agenda power: Some issues never make it into the public policy arena at all. The
ability to determine which do, and which do not, is termed “agenda power.” This
is a subtler dimension of power, in that it can determine environmental protection
outcomes before overt decision power comes into play. In his classic study The
Un-Politics of Air Pollution (1971), for example, Matthew Crenson describes how
corporate power in the steel-mill town of Gary, Indiana, kept air pollution off the
local government’s political agenda for years.

•

Value power: Individual preferences do not fall from the sky. The ability to
influence what other people want – what they will choose if given the opportunity to
do so – is an even subtler aspect of power (Lukes 1974). As John Kenneth Galbraith
(1973, p. 9) once observed, power can be deployed to persuade people that pollution
is “palatable or worth the cost.”

•

Event power: A final dimension of power is the ability to determine the
circumstances in which people make choices, rather the choices themselves.
Randall Bartlett (1989, p. 43) offers this hypothetical illustration: “Suppose I dig a
deep pit, fill it with poisonous snakes, and throw you in. I then stand on the edge
of the pit and offer to sell you a ladder. To buy or not to buy is not the only
question. What prior events made you need to buy, and my influence over them,
are also relevant.”
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All five dimensions of power are relevant to environmental protection. When the winners
from environmentally degrading economic activities wield greater purchasing power,
decision power, agenda power, value power, and/or event power than the losers, we can
expect less environmental protection than if the power balance is reversed.
Correlates of power
Power, as the term is used here, is inherently relative: individuals wield power vis-à-vis
others. In a world of solitary Robinson Crusoes, power would be absent (as would
“externalities”). Power depends both on individual attributes and on the political
framework in which these attributes are mapped into the five dimensions of power.
Correlations between individual attributes and power vary across societies. Wealth,
income, race, ethnicity, gender, and age are commonly among the most important
correlates. Richer individuals not only wield more purchasing power in the market for
private goods and services, but also tend to be well-endowed in the other dimensions of
power. For both reasons, we may expect affluent communities to receive higher levels of
environmental protection than low-income communities.
Although race and ethnicity are often correlated with economic class, they may have
independent effects on power. That is, holding wealth or income constant, members of
disadvantaged racial or ethnic groups may wield less power (apart from the purchasing
power dimension) than other groups. In the United States, for example, many studies
have found that African-Americans and Latinos systematically tend to bear
disproportionate burdens from pollution and environmental hazards, a relationship
explored further in section 5 below.
Gender and age can also be correlated with power, especially when these attributes
interact with economic class, race, or ethnicity. For example, Bina Agarwal (1992) has
documented how the degradation of forest resources in rural India has particularly severe
effects on poor women, via impacts on their time, income, and nutrition. Other studies in
India have found that indoor air pollution generated by cooking stoves has the most
adverse effects on women and children under five (Parikh, Smith, and Laxmi 1999).
Similarly, critics of inadequate regulation of pesticide use in the United States have
pointed out that children are most vulnerable to their effects (Wargo 1998).
The extent to which differences in these individual attributes translate into differences in
power depends on the political framework. Holding the distribution of income and other
attributes constant, a society with free elections and a high degree of respect for political
rights and civil liberties will have a more equal distribution of power than one with an
authoritarian or totalitarian regime. Despite the relatively egalitarian distribution of
income in the Soviet Union, for example, power was quite inequitably distributed, a
factor that arguably contributed to its dismal record in environmental protection (Pryde
1991).
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The next section analyzes how disparities in power, arising from interactions between
individual attributes and the political framework, can affect both the incidence of
environmental costs and the extent of environmental protection.
3. The Power-weighted Social Decision Rule
Formally, we can analyze the impact of the “non-economic” dimensions of power (that
is, the four dimensions other than purchasing power) by comparing actual social
decisions to those prescribed by the normative rule of benefit-cost analysis (BCA). The
BCA rule is:
max

∑b ,
i

i

where bi = the net benefit to the ith individual, with costs counted as negative benefits. The
outcome of this rule is “efficient” in the sense that total net benefits are maximized.4 These
benefits are conventionally measured in monetary terms, with non-market benefits and costs
assessed using various techniques founded on the criterion of “willingness to pay.” As a
result, in the shadow markets of BCA as in the actual markets for goods and services,
purchasing power plays a crucial role, a point to which I return below.
In many cases, social decisions can more accurately be better described by a powerweighted social decision rule (PWSDR), in which benefits and costs are weighed by the
power of those to whom they accrue (Boyce 1994):
max

∑π b

i i

i

where πi = the power of the ith individual. Whereas the benefit-cost rule addresses the
normative question of what a society should do, the PWSDR addresses the positive question
of what a society does. The two correspond only in the special case where all individuals
have equal power (that is, πi = πj for all i, j). The PWSDR predicts that environmental
protection decisions will systematically diverge from the “optimal” level prescribed by BCA
whenever power disparities exist between the winners (those for whom bi > 0) and the losers
(those for whom bi < 0).
Power here plays a role similar to that of “influence” in Becker’s (1983) model of fiscal
policy. The remedy that Becker proposes for inefficiencies arising from disparities in
influence is simply to downsize the state, thereby reducing the scope for the powerful to
4

This does not mean that the result is efficient in the strict sense of Pareto optimality. In practice, some people
typically are made worse off by decisions based on the BCA rule, notwithstanding the “potential Pareto
improvement” represented by a larger economic pie. As Amartya Sen (1987, p. 33) remarks, “The losers
could include the worst off and the most miserable in the society, and it is little consolation to be told that it
is possible to compensate them fully, but (‘good God!’) no actual plan to do so.”
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pursue private gains at the expense of the public good. When we turn to environmental
policy, however, the inadequacy of this remedy becomes evident. In the presence of
externalities, inefficiencies can result not only from government action, but also from
government inaction. In such cases, the only remedy for the inefficiencies caused by power
inequalities is democratization, defined as movement toward a more equal distribution of
power.
Power, like utility, is not directly observable. But in the same way that neoclassical
microeconomic theory infers utility from preferences as revealed by individual choice, so
we can infer power from the preferences as revealed by social choice. Like the utilitymaximization model of individual behavior, the PWSDR yields testable predictions.
Two hypotheses
Two hypotheses on environmental protection can be derived from the PWSDR. The first
concerns how the environmental-quality pie is sliced; the second concerns its overall size.
•

H1: Social choices regarding environmental protection will systematically favor
some individuals and groups over others, reflecting their relative power.

•

H2: The more unequal the distribution of power, the lower will be the level of
environmental protection and the greater the magnitude of environmental
degradation.

The rationale for the first hypothesis is straightforward, but the second requires some
elaboration.
The PWSDR can result in either “too much” environmental degradation or “too little” when
compared to the normative BCA rule. When the winners from environmentally degrading
economic activities are powerful relative to the losers, the PWSDR predicts too much
degradation; but when the losers are more powerful than the winners, it predicts too little.
Figure 1 depicts these possibilities, labeling them Type-I and Type-II inefficiencies,
respectively.
The “optimal” environmental degradation prescribed by BCA is represented by E* in Figure
1. Beyond this level, there is too much environmental degradation in that its marginal cost to
the losers exceeds its marginal benefit to the winners. This is equivalent to saying that the
marginal benefit of environmental protection would exceed its marginal cost. To the left of
E*, there is “too little” environmental degradation in the sense that the marginal benefits of
the environmentally degrading activity would exceed its costs. E* = “optimal” level
prescribed by cost-benefit analysis; E’ = level under the power-weighted social decision
rule when winners are more powerful than losers; E” = level under the power-weighted
social decision rule when losers are more powerful than winners.
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Figure1: Determination of the level of environmental degradation
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The notion of “too little” environmental degradation may seem odd to many
environmentalists. To be sure, there are good reasons to question the supposed “optimality”
of the level of environmental degradation that is prescribed by BCA. As noted above, BCA
typically values benefits and costs in terms of willingness to pay, which in turn depends on
preferences and ability to pay. Once we recognize the existence of value power – including
propaganda that aims to persuade people that pollution is “palatable or worth the cost” –
preferences become problematic as a guide to valuation. And since ability to pay is a
function of the distribution of purchasing power, the BCA prescription can be regarded as
optimal only if this distribution is considered optimal, too. In a society characterized by
substantial inequalities of wealth and power, these considerations imply that the level of
environmental degradation prescribed by BCA may be “too much.”
Yet one cannot reject altogether the notion of “too little” environmental degradation on
these grounds. Certainly there can be a range in which the marginal benefits of
environmentally degrading economic activities exceed their marginal costs, and it is by no
means inconceivable that where those who bear the costs are powerful relative to those who
reap the benefits the extent of these activities could be pushed below the “efficient” level.
For example, while living in Bangladesh in 1975 I witnessed a “beautification” campaign in
Dhaka, the capital, in which thousands of poor people were forcibly removed from the city.
The city had experienced an influx of impoverished families in the wake of a man-made
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famine in the previous year. 5 The makeshift houses they had constructed on vacant lots
were razed to the ground, and the residents were transported to squalid camps outside the
town, far from the eyes of the city’s more affluent residents and equally far from urban
employment opportunities. One day, near Dhaka’s General Post Office, I saw a squadron of
policemen clearing the street of beggars, using batons to prod the slow or reluctant onto the
truck that would haul them away. An emaciated baby sat on a rag on the sidewalk, her
mother having wandered down the street begging for alms. A policeman spotted the child,
picked her up, and tossed her into the back of the truck, which lumbered off in search of
more human eyesores.
To the architects of the beautification campaign, the very presence of the poor in Dhaka was
a kind of environmental degradation. This recalls the “externality” view of poverty:
People must not be allowed to become so poor that they offend or are hurtful to
society. It is not so much the misery and plight of the poor but the discomfort and
cost to the community which is crucial to this view of poverty. We have a problem of
poverty to the extent that low income creates problems for those who are not poor.
(Rein 1971, p. 46, cited by Sen 1981, p. 9)
The costs to the rich may have been modest, when compared to the benefits to the poor of
securing a livelihood in the city. But the expulsion of the poor reflected the balance of power
in urban Bangladesh.
If, in principle, power inequalities can cause both types of inefficiencies – too much
environmental degradation and too little – we must ask which is likely to be more prevalent.
The answer hinges on the correlation between net benefits (bi) and power (πi), summed over
all environmentally degrading economic activities. If the correlation is positive – that is, if
the winners tend to be more powerful than the losers – then the net environmental impact of
power inequalities will be more environmental degradation than would be prescribed by the
BCA rule. If the correlation is negative, the PWSDR yields the opposite result.
There is good reason to expect the correlation to be positive. The benefits from
environmentally degrading economic activities accrue to firms and individuals in the form
of producers’ surplus and consumers’ surplus. The rich generally reap more of both than do
the poor, by virtue of the simple facts that they own more productive assets and consume
more goods and services. Hence we can expect wealth to be correlated with net benefits. At
the same time, wealth is generally correlated with power. If both benefits and power are
correlated with wealth, they are likely to be correlated with each other. Type-I inefficiencies
are therefore likely to be more prevalent than Type-II inefficiencies, in which case wider
inequalities in the distribution of power lead to higher overall levels of environmental
degradation.

5

For accounts of the famine, see Ravallion (1987) and Sen (1981, Ch. 9).
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4. Income Distribution and the Demand for Environmental Quality
The foregoing analysis does not imply that affluent individuals are untroubled by
environmental degradation. On the contrary, it is likely that clean air, clean water, and many
other environmental amenities are “normal” goods for which demand (measured by
willingness and ability to pay) rises with income. “If you want a better environment,”
Wilfred Beckerman (1996, p. 27) claims, “you have to become rich.”
This claim can be applied to individual households or to societies as a whole. At the
household level, it implies that within countries, richer households are most inclined to
protect the environment. At the national level, it implies that across countries and over time,
higher average incomes will lead to better environmental quality. In this section I consider
the relationship between income and environmental quality at the household level; Section 7
considers this relationship at the national level.
In principle, changes in income distribution could alter the valuation of environmental costs.
If rich people place a higher value on environmental quality than do poor people, then a
regressive redistribution of income from poor to rich might translate into higher demand for
environmental quality. Could this offset the impact of the inefficiencies arising from any
associated shift in power inequalities, such that greater income inequality results in less
environmental degradation rather than more?
The answer hinges on four things: first, whether demand for environmental quality rises
more sharply with income among upper-income households or among lower-income
households, that is, whether the demand-income relation is convex or concave; second,
whether the income effect is sufficiently strong to outweigh the “price effect” arising from
foregone producers’ and consumers’ surplus; third, the scope for substituting private
environmental amenities for public ones; and fourth, the impact of inequality on collective
action for the provision of public goods.
Income and demand for environmental quality
At any given level of average income, greater income inequality means not only higher
incomes for the rich but also lower incomes for the poor. Assuming that environmental
quality is a normal good – that is, the income elasticity of demand for environmental quality
is positive – a redistribution of income from the poor to the rich will increase the demand of
the rich but at the same time it will decrease the demand of the poor. The net effect on
demand depends on the shape of the demand-income relation.
Three possibilities are depicted in Figure 2. In the first panel, Figure 2(a), demand for
environmental quality increases with income at a constant rate. In this case, changes in
income inequality would have no net effect on the demand for environmental quality:
redistributing income from one end of the spectrum to the other does not affect total
demand. In Figure 2(b), the demand-income relation is convex. In this case, greater income
inequality leads to higher total demand. In Figure 2(c), the demand-income relation is
concave. In this case, greater income inequality leads to lower total demand.
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Figure 2: Household income and demand for environmental quality
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The claim that greater income inequality (as distinct from higher average incomes) leads to
greater demand for environmental quality therefore hinges, first, on the assumption that the
demand-income relation in convex as in Figure 2(b).
The price of environmental quality
Environmental quality has a price, in form of producers’ and consumer’s surplus foregone
when external costs are internalized. Pollution abatement and other measures to protect the
environment raise the firm’s internal costs of production. This results in lower producer
incomes and/or higher consumer prices, depending on how readily the firm can pass cost
increases on to its customers. A more unequal income distribution means that the rich reap a
greater share of producers’ and consumers’ surplus. Wider income inequality thus raises the
“price” of environmental protection to the rich. This price effect operates in the opposite
direction of the income effect. Returning to Figure 1, these two effects could be represented
by rises in the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves, respectively. Whether the
“efficient” level of environmental degradation rises or falls depends on the balance between
the two.
In other words, even though richer individuals may desire more environmental quality, but
they also desire more of the goods and services that are responsible for environmental
degradation. Faced with this tradeoff, it is not obvious that their desire for environmental
quality will prevail. The claim that greater income inequality leads to greater demand for
environmental quality therefore hinges, second, on the assumption that the income effect
outweighs the price effect.

12
Private-public substitution
Many elements of environmental quality are not pure public goods. To some extent, at least,
the affluent can purchase private environmental quality (or private insulation from public
bads), by living in relatively unpolluted enclaves, drinking bottled water, and taking
holidays in pristine locations, and so on. The extent to which their demand for
environmental quality translates into demand for the public elements of environmental
quality depends on the scope for substitution between the private and public elements.
Studies of environmental disparities within countries and regions, some of which are
reviewed in Section 5, provide evidence that many important aspects of environmental
quality indeed are not pure public goods. These studies have documented the higher-thanaverage levels of pollution and environmental hazards to which low-income communities
and disempowered racial and ethnic groups are exposed. The flip side of this coin is that
high-income communities and more powerful groups are exposed to lower-than-average
levels of pollution and hazards.
Insofar as the costs from environmentally degrading economic activities can be imposed on
others – separated spatially, as well as socially, from the beneficiaries – the affluent can
have their environmental-quality cake and eat it too, protecting favored locations while
despoiling others. Carried to its extreme, this could yield world partitioned into “sacred
groves and sacrifice zones” (Hecht 2002). The claim that greater income inequality leads to
greater demand for public environmental quality therefore hinges, third, on the assumption
that the scope for substituting private environmental quality for public environmental quality
is sufficiently small.
Collective action
Insofar as environmental quality cannot be purchased privately, but is indeed a public good,
its provision requires more than individual demand. It also requires collective action to solve
the free-rider problem. The degree of income inequality may affect a society’s ability to
engage in collective action. As the essays in this volume attest, ascertaining the direction of
this effect is not a straightforward matter. On the one hand, inequality may facilitate
collective action by fostering the emergence of strong leaders who are able to internalize a
large share of the benefits from public goods and enforce the rules of cooperation. On the
other hand, inequality may corrode the bonds of sympathy and trust that constitute “social
capital.” The net effect may vary from time to time, and from place to place. The claim that
greater income inequality leads to more environmental protection therefore hinges, fourth,
on the assumption that inequality facilitates, or at least does not seriously impede, collective
action.
Taken together, then, a rather restrictive set of assumptions must hold true for income
inequality to have a positive effect on environmental protection. Demand for environmental
quality must be convex in income. The resultant income effect must outweigh the price
effect arising from the costs of environmental protection in terms of reduced producers’ and
consumers’ surplus. The scope for fulfilling demand for environmental quality privately
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must be too small to displace the increased demand for the public elements of environmental
quality. And the impact of income inequality on the society’s ability to engage in collective
action must not undermine the effectiveness of this demand. If all of these conditions hold,
then higher income inequality would raise the “efficient” level of environmental protections,
and this could outweigh the inefficiencies resulting from any associated increase in power
disparities. Otherwise, income inequality may have an adverse effect on environmental
protection. Empirical studies can shed light on which outcome is more common in practice.
5. Environmental Injustice
This section briefly reviews studies of environmental injustice in the United States, to assess
whether the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the direction of environmental
protection (that is, who is protected from whom) reflects power inequalities related to class,
racial, and ethnic differences. No attempt will be made here to provide a comprehensive
survey of this large and growing literature.6 Instead I highlight a few key issues.
Early studies
In the 1980s, several influential studies appeared that examined the distribution of
environmental hazards along race and class lines in the United States (Bullard 1983; U.S.
General Accounting Office 1993; United Church of Christ 1987; Bullard 1990). The main
focus of these early studies was the correlation between the location of hazardous waste sites
and the demographic characteristics of the communities in which they are located. Their
general conclusion was that such sites are located disproportionately in communities with
above-average percentages of African-American residents and below-average household
incomes.
Apart from the statistical correlations reported in these studies, “smoking gun” evidence of
environmental injustice surfaced in the Cerrell report, a 1984 consultant’s report
commissioned by the California Waste Management Board. Noting that “political criteria
have become every bit as important in determining the outcome of a project as engineering
factors” and that “a great deal of time, resources, and planning could be saved and political
problems avoided if people who are resentful and people who are amenable to Waste-toEnergy projects [a.k.a. incinerators] could be identified before selecting a site,” the report
recommended that “middle and higher-socioeconomic strata neighborhoods should not fall
at least within the one-mile and five-mile radii of the proposed site” (Cerrell Associates
1984, pp. 17, 31, 43).7

6
7

For literature reviews, see Szasz and Meuser (1997), Bowen (2000, Ch. 6), and Pastor (2001).

Other attributes included in the report’s “personality profile” of those likely to offer the least resistance to
siting decisions included “older people, people with a high school education or less, and those who adhere to a
free market orientation” (Cerrell Associates 1984, p. 43).
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How near is “near”?
One source of controversy in the subsequent literature has been the appropriate unit of
analysis. Early studies often relied on fairly high levels of aggregation, such as postal zip
codes. Using data at the census tract level, Anderton et al. (1994a, b) examined socioeconomic correlates of tracts with and without hazardous waste transfer, storage, and
disposal (TSDF) facilities. Controlling for industrial and manufacturing employment in the
tract, they found that tracts with TSDFs had below-average incomes, but not above-average
percentages of African-Americans or other minorities.8 These results have been interpreted
as implying that allegations of “environmental racism” lack a sound statistical basis.9
Anderton et al. (1994b, p. 236) report, however, that if “near” is defined to mean census
tracts at least 50% of whose area lies within a 2.5-mile radius from the center of a TSDF
tract, “the mean percentage black population in the nearby surrounding tracts is much
greater (25.7%) than when a comparison is drawn with all non-TSDF tracts (15.2%).”
In a doctoral dissertation based on the same research project, Oakes (1997) provides further
details on the spatial relationships between community demographics and TSDFs. The
TSDF tracts are characterized by a “remarkable” magnitude of industrialization (p. 123),
with far lower population densities than the non-TSDF tracts (pp. 118).10 The percentages of
minorities residing within the TSDF tracts is roughly the same as the metropolitan average,
but the data for tracts located within one mile of the centroid of TSDF tracts reveals a
strikingly different picture: the percentages of blacks, Hispanics, impoverished families, and
households receiving public assistance is substantially higher than the average. These
percentages decline as distance from a TSDF tract increases beyond the one-mile radius,
falling below the average levels at around five miles (see Figure 3). In light of the claim that
the Anderton et al. findings refute the existence of environmental racism, it is worth quoting
Oakes (1997, p. 122) at some length:
[O]ne cannot help but be drawn to the sharp rise in the percentage of black persons
in neighborhoods one mile from TSDF neighborhoods. This average rises sharply to
about 30%. The average for neighborhoods two miles from TSDF neighborhoods
falls to about 27%. Past the two-mile point, the average falls fairly consistently until
about five miles, where it becomes less than the mean percentage black for the
whole sample. The result is dramatic. While it remains true that the average
8

The use of control variables for industrial or manufacturing employment (or similar proxies for the
presence of industrial facilities) can be questioned on methodological grounds, since the siting of these
facilities (with their associated hazards, including TSDFs) may itself be affected by the racial, ethnic, or
class characteristics of nearby communities.
9

For example, Bowen (2000, p. 166) writes: “Thus if one used zip-code or other larger geographical areas
… one would mistakenly conclude that minorities live closer to the sites, when in fact the demographics
closest to the site show no patterns whatsoever.”
10

“On average,” Oakes (1997, p. 123) reports, “there are about 33 industrial firms in TSDF neighborhoods,
while other neighborhoods typically host about 7 industrial firms. It is fair to characterize TSDF
neighborhoods as industrial neighborhoods.” The average population density in TSDF tracts was 724
persons/km2, while the average in non-TSDF tracts was 2281 persons/km2.
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percentage black persons in TSDF neighborhoods is no greater than the same
average in non-TSDF neighborhoods, at least some neighborhoods near TSDF
neighborhoods contain a much greater percentage of black persons. Furthermore,
the average percentage of black persons in neighborhoods surrounding TSDFs falls
consistently as distance is increased past two miles.
There is no obvious a priori basis for judging the “right” spatial unit of analysis – how close
people must live to an environmental hazard for it to be judged relevant to their well-being,
and hence relevant to analyses of environmental justice. It clearly would be rash, however,
to claim that the only relevant unit is the (predominantly industrial) census tract within
which the hazard is located, and that the demographic characteristics of nearby residential
communities are inconsequential. Contrary to the “spin” often placed on their findings, the
results of the study by Anderton et al. therefore offer strong evidence of environmental
injustice along lines of race and ethnicity as well as class.
Siting versus “move-in”
A further issue of debate in the literature is the direction of causality. In theory, correlations
between the location of environmental hazards and the demographic characteristics of
______________________________________________________

Figure 3: Demographic characteristics by distance to nearest TSDF tract
(with 95% confidence intervals)

Source: Oakes (1997, p. 147).
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nearby communities could arise not only as a result of siting decisions, but also as a result of
post-siting demographic changes. After the siting of a nuisance, those who can afford to do
so might move elsewhere, and at the same time falling property values might lure others to
move in. Such “market dynamics” may cause or contribute to the correlations (Been 1994).
While siting decisions can be seen as unambiguous evidence of environmental inequity,
move-in may seem less reprehensible, since the resulting disparities are the result of choices
freely made by individuals (constrained, as in all economic choices, by their incomes) to
accept lower environmental quality in return for housing that is preferable to the alternatives
in other respects. In such cases, disproportionate exposure to hazards is “merely” a function
of lack of income, rather than lack of power.11
The most thorough longitudinal study of this issue is an analysis of TSDF siting in Los
Angeles County from 1970 to 1990 (Pastor et al. 2001). Examining demographic patterns
before and after the siting of TSDFs, the authors find little evidence of disproportionate
move-in along racial or ethnic lines. They find strong evidence, on the other hand, that
neighborhoods with above-average percentages of African-Americans and Latinos and with
below-average incomes before the siting decision were more likely to receive a TSDF. The
authors conclude that “demographics reflecting political weakness” are the most reliable
predictors of where TSDFs will be sited.
Political economy of vulnerability
While a growing body of evidence documents that race, ethnicity, and class are correlated
with the incidence of environmental costs, the mechanisms by which these characteristics
affect vulnerability have yet to be explored in detail. Hamilton (1993) and Brooks and
Sethi (1997) find that voter participation, a variable they interpret as a proxy for the
propensity of communities to engage in collective action, is a statistically significant
predictor of TSDF siting and toxic air releases, respectively. In the Los Angeles study,
Pastor et al. (2001) find that neighborhoods that are fairly evenly split between AfricanAmericans and Latinos, and those that are undergoing “ethnic churning” or rapid changes in
their demographic composition, are most vulnerable to TSDF siting. Pastor (2001) suggests
that this arises from the relatively weak “social capital” in such neighborhoods.
Siting versus exposure
Most environmental justice studies have focused on the location of hazardous facilities,
rather than the resulting exposure to pollutants. Information on exposure or exposure risks
could provide more direct evidence of environmental inequities. Such information also may
help to resolve the unit-of-analysis issue discussed above.
A new database being developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) makes
such studies more feasible. Drawing on data from the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), the
11

Note that the “move-in” explanation for environmental disparities is more plausible when proximity to
hazards is negatively correlated with income than when it is correlated with race or ethnicity, holding
income constant.
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EPA’s Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) project is intended mainly to
provide information for the prioritization of risk-reduction efforts. The TRI contains
annual data on the volume (by weight) of toxic chemical releases by thousands of
industrial facilities across the United States. The usefulness of these data for assessing
hazards to nearby communities has been limited, however, by the fact that the hundreds
of chemicals covered in the inventory vary in toxicity by as much as seven orders of
magnitude, and by the lack of information on how these releases are dispersed by
prevailing winds and water currents. The RSEI project incorporates information on
toxicity and dispersal, partitioning the entire country into a one-square-kilometer grid for
this purpose. A national-level analysis of these exposure-risk data reveals that the
localities facing the greatest risks are inhabited by significantly higher-than-average
percentages of blacks, Latinos, and Asian-Americans (Bouwes et al. 2001). The
disparities are even sharper when dummy variables are included to control for variations
across metropolitan areas: within the nation’s metropolitan areas, people of color
systematically tend to live on the “wrong side” of the environmental tracks (Fetter and
Ash 2002).
So what?
A final set of issues relates to the consequences of environmental injustice. What are the
impacts of environmental burdens on the economic, physical, and emotional well-being of
people who reside in the affected communities – and how important are these compared to
the other problems they confront in their daily lives? There is evidence, for example, that
health is affected adversely by poverty and inequality (Kaplan et al. 1996; Kennedy et al.
1996), but the role of environmental variables in this regard has yet to be explored in depth.
A recent study of variations in school performance in metropolitan Los Angeles suggests
that, controlling for other socioeconomic predictors, exposure to airborne toxics has a
statistically significant negative effect on academic test scores (Pastor et al., 2000). Other
potential effects that warrant investigation include impacts on property values, medical
expenses, and days lost from work due to illness.
6. Inequality and Environmental Quality: Evidence from the United States
The second hypothesis derived from the power-weighted social decision rule – that
inequalities in the distribution of power affect the total magnitude of environmental
degradation – has been tested in a study of the United States by Boyce et al. (1999), using
cross-sectional data from the 50 states. As a unit of analysis, the state is attractive in that
while all 50 states operate within the same overall U.S. political framework, the state
governments play a major role in the formulation and enforcement of environmental
protection policies, with considerable state-to-state variations.
The study estimates a recursive econometric model in which power inequality affects
environmental policy, these policies affect environmental quality, and this in turn affects
public health. The structure of the model is depicted in Figure 4. To construct a state-level
measure of power inequality, Boyce et al. combine data on four variables: voter
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participation, educational attainment, Medicaid access, and tax fairness. Higher voter
participation is taken to indicate a more equal distribution of power. Higher educational
attainment – measured as the proportion of adults who have graduated from secondary
school – is taken as another indicator of a more equal distribution of power, on the
assumption that there are important links between information and power. Access to the
Medicaid program (which provides health care to poor families who qualify under rules
that vary from state-to-state) and a composite measure of tax fairness are taken to reflect
power disparities on the expenditure and revenue side of state fiscal policies,
respectively. The common feature of this set of variables is estimated statistically as their
first principal component. By the resulting measure, the state of Minnesota has the most
equal distribution of power, and Mississippi the most unequal distribution.
______________________________________________________

Figure 4: A recursive model of power inequality, the environment, and public health

Source: Boyce et al. (1999, p. 132).
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To assess the validity of this measure of power inequality and shed light on its underlying
determinants, the authors estimate the following equation, with and without regional
dummy variables:

π = α1 + β1G + β2Y + β3RACE + β4ETH + µ1

(1)

where π is power inequality; G is the Gini ratio of income distribution; Y is per capita
income; RACE is the percentage of African-Americans in the state’s population; ETH is the
percentage of people of Hispanic origin; and µ1 is an independent, normally distributed error
term with zero mean. The results indicate that higher income inequality, higher percentages
of African-Americans, and higher percentages of Hispanics are associated with greater
power inequalities, and that higher average income is associated with lower power
inequalities. Together, these variables “explain” more than half of the variation in power
inequality across the 50 states.
The authors then analyze the impact of power inequality on environmental policies, using
an environmental policy index (EP) that is based on 77 indicators of the strength of state
environmental policies in areas from toxic waste management, air quality and water
quality to recycling, agriculture, energy and transportation. They estimate the following
equation:
EP = α2 + γ1π+ γ2MAN + γ3URB + γ4PD +µ2

(2)

where the three control variables – the manufacturing share of output (MAN), urbanization
(URB), and population density (PD) – are expected to generate demand for stronger
environmental policies. This model “explains” about two-thirds of the variation in the
environmental policy index. The estimated coefficients all have the expected signs, at levels
of statistical significance ranging from 0.01% (in the case of the power inequality) to 5% (in
the case of population density).
Next the authors analyze the impact of environmental policies on environmental quality,
using an aggregate measure of environmental stress (ES) based on 167 indicators,
including data on air and water pollution, toxic chemical releases, transportation
efficiency, and the health of forests and fisheries:
ES = α3 + δ1EP + δ2MAN + δ3URB + δ4PD + µ3

(3)

This model “explains” roughly half the variance in the environmental stress index. The
estimated coefficient on the environmental policy index has the expected sign and is
statistically significant at the 0.01% level; manufacturing and urbanization also are
statistically significant as determinants of environmental stress, but population density
has no significant independent effect. A Hausman test for endogeneity of the
environmental policy index is negative; after controlling for manufacturing intensity,
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urbanization, and population density, greater environmental stress does not appear to lead
to stronger environmental policies.12
Finally, the authors examine the impact of environmental stress on public health by
estimating the following model:
HEALTH = α4 + Φ1ES + Φ2π + µ4

(4)

where HEALTH is one of three measures of public health – infant mortality, the premature
death rate, and a composite public health index. The power inequality measure is included
on the right-hand side of equation (4) to allow for the possibility that it affects public health
by avenues apart from environmental stress. The results indicate that states with greater
environmental stress have poorer public health by all three measures, with the estimated
coefficients statistically significant at the 5% level. When power inequality is included as
an independent variable, it too has statistically significant adverse effects on all three
public health variables; the adverse effect of environmental stress remains statistically
significant at the 5% level in two of the three cases. This suggests that environmental
impacts are one route by which power inequality diminishes public health, but not the
only one.
In sum, the study by Boyce et al. (1999) provides empirical support for the hypothesis that
greater power inequality leads to weaker environmental policies, and that weaker policies in
turn lead to greater environmental degradation. This suggests that inequalities in the
distribution of power operate not only to the detriment of specific groups, but also to the
detriment of environmental quality in the state as a whole.
7. Inequality and Environmental Quality: International Evidence
International data have also been used to test the hypothesis that political and economic
inequalities adversely affect environmental protection and environmental quality. Empirical
research in this field confronts a number of difficulties: the paucity of internationally
comparable data on environmental quality and on political and economic inequality; the
pitfalls of international cross-sectional analysis, where the ceteris paribus assumption is
always questionable; and the rather limited scope for deriving useful conclusions from timeseries variations, given that the linkages between inequality and environmental quality are
expected to operate over an extended time horizon.
In recent years, however, international data have become available that permit some
exploration of this topic. Several recent studies have ventured into this terrain, allowing us
to draw some preliminary conclusions. The starting point for this research has been analysis
12

Whereas stronger environmental policies are expected to lead to lower environmental stress, higher
environmental stress might lead to stronger environmental policies. If such endogeneity were present, this
would bias the estimate of δ1 so as to make it less (rather than more) likely that equation (3) would yield a
statistically significant estimate with the expected sign.
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of the “environmental Kuznets curve,” a stylized relationship suggesting that environmental
quality initially deteriorates as national per capita income rises, but then goes on to improve
as per capita income rises further. This section reviews the handful of such studies that have
examined the role of political and economic inequalities in this relationship.
The “environmental Kuznets curve”
The World Bank’s World Development Report 1992, which took the environment as its
thematic focus, observed that some environmental problems “initially worsen but then
improve as incomes rise,” and claimed that “most forms of air and water pollution” fit into
this category (World Bank 1992, p. 10). A number of subsequent studies, among the most
widely cited of which is one by Grossman and Krueger (1995), have reported the
existence of such a relationship for a number of environmental variables.13 This pattern
has been dubbed the “environmental Kuznets curve” (EKC) by virtue of its resemblance
to the inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and per capita income
first posited by Simon Kuznets (1955).
The EKC immediately provoked controversy, in part because it could be cast as a
prescription for complacency. Just as some economists interpreted the original Kuznets
curve to mean that developing countries need not worry about income distribution, but
should rely instead on economic growth to solve problems of poverty and inequality, so
critics feared that the EKC would offer ammunition to “gung-ho” proponents of growth
by downplaying environmental concerns. To be sure, the upward-sloping segment of the
EKC shows that environmental quality initially deteriorates as per capita incomes rise, up
to a turning point that is often estimated to be around $5000 per capita (roughly the level
of Mexico or the Czech Republic). In the range of incomes below this level – where the
most of the world’s nations and people are located – rising incomes would therefore be
accompanied by a worsening of environmental quality. This suggests that even though
environmental quality may be a “normal good” with a positive income elasticity of
demand, the offsetting factors discussed in section 4 tend to dominate within this range.
But the downward-sloping segment of the EKC suggests that eventually the deterioration
in environmental quality can be reversed, and that further rises in per capita incomes help
to bring this about.
Most authors agree that such reversals, if and when they occur, result from the introduction
of policies for environmental protection. “There is nothing automatic about this
improvement,” the World Bank (1992, p. 10) suggests; “it occurs only when countries
deliberately introduce policies to ensure that additional resources are devoted to dealing with
environmental problems.” Similarly, Grossman and Krueger (pp. 371-2) suggest that “an
induced policy response” in the form of tougher environmental regulations, driven by
citizen demand, provides the principal link between rising incomes and declining
pollution, and caution that “there is no reason to believe the process is an automatic one.”
This echoes Kuznets’ (1955, p. 28) conclusion regarding the relationship between per

13

For a critical review of EKC studies, see Stern (1998).
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capita income and income distribution: “Effective work in this field necessarily calls for a
shift from market economics to political and social economy.”
The impact of power inequality
Building on this insight, several studies have examined the effects of variables related to
power inequality on international variations in environmental quality. Torras and Boyce
(1998) examine variations in air pollution (ambient concentrations of sulfur dioxide, smoke,
and heavy particles), water pollution (concentrations of dissolved oxygen and fecal
coliform), and the percentages of the population with access to safe water and sanitation
facilities. In addition to per capita income and income distribution, they include two
explanatory variables – adult literacy and an index of political rights and civil liberties – that
they consider relevant to the distribution of power. In the case of low-income countries, they
find that the estimated coefficients on the rights and literacy variables have the expected
signs in all cases, and are statistically significant in five of the seven cases for the rights
variable and in four of the seven for the literacy variable. They obtain mixed results in the
high-income countries, suggesting that rights and literacy are most important as
determinants of environmental quality when average incomes are low.
Scruggs (1998) uses an index of political rights and civil liberties in an empirical exercise
based on a mixed set of high and low-income countries. He finds that greater rights have a
statistically significant favorable effect on sulfur dioxide concentrations; favorable but
statistically insignificant effects on particulates and fecal coliform pollution; and a
statistically significant adverse effect on dissolved oxygen.
Barrett and Graddy (2000) also examine the impact of civil liberties and political rights,
advancing the rationale that environmental quality depends not only on national income, but
also on “citizens being able to acquire information about the quality of their environment, to
assemble and organize, and to give voice to their preferences for environmental quality; and
on governments having an incentive to satisfy these preferences by changing policy, perhaps
the most powerful incentive being the desire to get elected or re-elected” (p. 434). They find
the empirical evidence to be consistent with this expectation in the case of air pollution by
sulfur dioxide, smoke, and particulates: “pollution levels are monotonically decreasing in
the extent of democratic freedoms” (p. 440). In the case of water pollutants, they find the
rights variables to have significant favorable effects in the cases of fecal coliform, arsenic,
and lead. For several other water quality variables, including dissolved oxygen, they find no
statistically significant effects.14
Harbaugh et al. (2000) include a “democracy index” – a 0-10 index of the extent of
democratic participation in government – in a re-examination of the evidence on sulfur
dioxide, smoke, and particulate air pollution, using environmental data from the same source
as the World Bank (1992), Grossman and Krueger (1995), Torras and Boyce (1998), and
Barrett and Grady (2000). After cleaning and updating these data, the authors conclude that
14

The authors note that “oxygen loss does not threaten human health directly” (p. 447), perhaps helping to
explain the lack of significant effects in this case.
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“the evidence for an inverted-U relationship [between pollution and per capita income] is
much less robust than previously thought” (p. 2). At the same time, however, their
regression results reveal a very robust relationship between these pollutants and the
democracy index: the estimated coefficients invariably have the expected sign, and they are
statistically significant at the 1% level in twelve of the thirteen specifications tested.
Finally, Neumayer (2002) examines the impact of four different proxies for “democracy” on
international environmental commitments by national governments, including their
ratification of and compliance with multilateral environmental agreements and participation
in intergovernmental environmental organizations. He argues that a focus on environmental
commitments, rather than environmental outcomes, is appropriate given the potentially long
time lags between commitments and outcomes, the difficulty of monitoring outcomes, and
the sensitivity of outcomes to factors outside a government’s control. While it can be argued
that environmental commitments are not terribly important unless they do affect outcomes,
it is certainly true that commitments tell us something about environmental protection and
may be relatively easy to monitor. Neumayer finds strong evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that democracies exhibit stronger environmental commitments; in most cases the
estimated coefficients on the proxy variables are statistically significant, with the expected
sign.
In sum, the international studies that have been carried out so far offer fairly robust support
to the hypothesis that inequalities in the distribution of power lead to weaker environmental
protection and greater environmental degradation.
The impact of income inequality
Given the axes of the original Kuznets curve, surprisingly few EKC-type studies have
explored the relationship between environmental quality and income distribution. There
are two reasons why such a relationship might exist. The first is the political-economy
effect arising from the correlation between the distribution of income and the distribution
of power: ceteris paribus, countries with more unequal income distributions will tend to
have more unequal power distributions. Of course, ceteris is seldom paribus, as the
example of the former Soviet Union – where a highly unequal distribution of power coexisted with a fairly egalitarian income distribution – reminds us. Insofar as income
inequality does translate into greater power inequality, however, the power-weighted
social decision rule leads to the prediction that at any given level of average income,
countries with higher income inequality will have higher levels of environmental
degradation.
A second reason why income distribution may matter for the environment is that the
amount of environmental degradation per unit of income may vary systematically across
households ranked by income. If so, the overall level of environmental degradation will
reflect not only the country’s average income, but also the distribution of income across
households. The sign of this “aggregation effect” depends on the shape of the relationship
between household income and environmental degradation (Heerink et al. 2001). If the
relation is concave – a pattern sometimes termed a “household-level environmental

24
Kuznets curve” (Kahn 1998) – the aggregation effect implies that greater income inequality
will lead to less environmental degradation (as income is redistributed from lower-income
households with higher marginal environmental degradation per dollar to upper-income
households with lower degradation per dollar). In this case, the aggregation effect runs
counter to the political-economy effect, making the theoretical net impact of income
inequality ambiguous. If the relation is convex, the aggregation effect implies that greater
income inequality will lead to more environmental degradation. In this case, the two effects
are mutually reinforcing.
______________________________________________________

Figure 5: Some possible relations between household income and environmental degradation
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These two possibilities are depicted in Figure 5. As in Figure 2, the horizontal axes depict
household income, but instead of demand for environmental quality, the vertical axes depict
the amount of environmental degradation attributable to the household (by virtue of its
sources of income, pattern of consumption expenditure, or some combination of the two). In
Figure 5(a), environmental degradation is concave in household income. Marginal
degradation diminishes as income increases. Beyond some income level, MED may even
turn negative – that is, further increments to income are associated with environmental
improvements – causing total degradation to decline. In Figure 5(b), the environmental
degradation is convex in household income: high-income households generate more
environmental degradation per dollar income than do low-income households.15 The sign of
the aggregation effect depends on the shape of the curve. The political-economy effect is
depicted by the broken-line curves in Figure 5: whatever the shape of the relationship
between household income and environmental degradation relation, higher inequality shifts
the curve upward, with higher levels of environmental degradation at each level of
household income.16
Attempts to allocate responsibility for aggregate environmental degradation across
individual households would face formidable conceptual difficulties. One approach is to
allocate responsibility so on the basis of consumer expenditure: a household that buys an
automobile is thus responsible for the environmental impacts generated by its production,
use, and ultimate disposal.17 A limitation of this approach is that consumers often have little
information about the environmental impacts generated in the production of the goods and
services they buy; it stretches the notion of “consumer sovereignty” to ascribe these impacts
entirely to consumer preferences.18 An alternative approach is to allocate responsibility on
the basis of income sources: households that derive income from the production of
automobiles, in the form of profits or wages, bear responsibility for the associated
environmental impacts. A limitation of this approach is that decisions on pollution control
are typically in the hands of managers, not workers; it would be hard to infer much about
workers’ environmental preferences on this basis. The practical data requirements of
15

As in Figure 5(a), the curves in Figure 5(b) are drawn to allow for the possibility of negative MED (and
thus a downward-sloping segment of the ED curve), in this case at lower income levels.
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For simplicity, I have drawn this “shift effect” so as to leave marginal environmental damage (MED)
unchanged. Uneven shifts across the income range would change the MED curve, too.
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In the case of automobiles, the share of each of the three stages of the product life-cycle – production,
use, and disposal – in total environmental costs are estimated at 33%, 60%, and 7%, respectively (Kay1997,
p. 93).
18

Moreover, circumstantial factors can affect the resulting pattern. For example, lower-income households
in the United States tend to drive older vehicles that were built when emissions and fuel-efficiency
standards were less stringent, whereas the rich tend to drive newer vehicles for which the standards are
higher (Harrington and McConnell 1999, p. 22). This resulting pattern, arising from the phase-in of stricter
regulations, may not generalize to other circumstances. For example, the recent boom in purchases by
upper-income U.S. households of “sport utility vehicles” (SUVs) that are exempt from fuel-efficiency
standards may reverse the pattern.
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implementing either approach (or some combination of the two) are also formidable. The
consumption-based approach requires detailed data on consumer expenditure (among
households ranked by income or expenditure), input-output data on the quantities of raw
materials and intermediate goods used in finished products, and data on the associated
environmental impacts.19 The production-based approach requires detailed data on wages,
salaries, and profits, in addition to input-output and environmental impact data. In either
case, the relationship between household incomes and environmental degradation clearly
depends on more than individual demand for environmental quality, as discussed in section
4.
A further complication arises from the fact that some environmental degradation is caused
by public-sector activities. There is no obvious way to allocate responsibility for the releases
of radioactive materials at the Rocky Flats, Colorado, nuclear weapons plant, or for the
dumping of bacteriological warfare agents on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea, across
individual Americans or former Soviet citizens, ranked by their household incomes. Such
cases highlight the importance of political-economy effects.
The few empirical studies that have included income distribution in EKC-type regressions
have yielded mixed results. Torras and Boyce (1998) estimate the effect of the Gini
coefficient of income distribution alongside the effects of adult literacy and political rights
and civil liberties. Their results thus control for the impact of these aspects of power
inequality on environmental quality. In the low-income countries, they find that greater
income equality is associated with lower levels of air pollution from sulfur dioxide and
smoke (with the estimated coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% level). They
also find that greater income equality is associated with higher levels of access to safe
drinking water, greater access to sanitation facilities, and lower levels of fecal coliform in
water bodies (though the relationship is statistically significant only in the case of safe
water). In the same countries, however, greater income equality was associated with worse
environmental quality for two variables: heavy-particle air pollution and dissolved oxygen
in water bodies.20
Scruggs (1998) includes income distribution as a regressor in two empirical tests. The first,
using data from a mixed set of 25-29 countries, analyzes two water-quality variables
(dissolved oxygen and fecal coliform) and two air-quality variables (sulfur dioxide and
particulates). He finds that income equality has a statistically significant favorable effect on
dissolved oxygen, and a statistically significant adverse effect in the case of particulates; in
the other two cases, its effect is adverse but not statistically significant. In a second exercise,
using data from seventeen OECD countries, Scruggs takes as the dependent variable a
composite index based on “levels of municipal waste, fertilizer use, and sulfur dioxide,
19

Studies of the distributional incidence of environmental taxes have assembled such data for certain
pollutants; see, for example, Metcalf (1999).
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For high-income countries the estimated impact of income inequality was generally weaker, a result
consistent with Kuznets’ (1963, p. 49) conjecture that “not only the welfare equivalents but also the power
equivalents of the same relative income spread show a much wider range when the underlying average
income is low than when it is high.”
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nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide emissions” (p. 269). This is a rather curious set: the
volume of municipal waste may be less relevant than how that waste is treated; how much
fertilizer is used may be less relevant than what kinds, where, and how it is applied; nitrous
oxide presumably is mistaken for nitrogen oxides; and the inclusion of carbon dioxide
emissions is problematic since pollutants with long-term global impacts are less likely to
generate policy responses than pollutants with short-term local impacts.21 In four of five
specifications, Scruggs finds that income equality has an adverse impact on this composite
environmental variable, although in no case is the estimated coefficient statistically
significant at the 5% level.22
Magnani (2000) examines the impact of income distribution on public research and
development expenditures for environmental protection in a set of OECD countries. Using a
model in which social decisions are determined simply by the preferences of the median
voter, she hypothesizes that income inequality reduces pro-environmental public
expenditure due to a “relative income effect,” whereby greater inequality shifts the
preferences of those with below-average income (including the median voter) in favor of
greater consumption of private goods and lower expenditure on environmental public
goods.23 She finds that in those countries with average or above-average per capita incomes,
greater income equality has a positive effect on environmental expenditures; in countries
with below-average levels of per capita income her results are less definitive.
Heerink et al. (2001) include income distribution in a regression analysis of international
variations in airborne sulfur dioxide and particulate concentrations, carbon dioxide
emissions, access to safe water and sanitation, deforestation, and (for a 16-country sample of
sub-Saharan African countries) the depletion of soil nitrogen and phosphorus. In six of these
eight cases, the estimated coefficient on income distribution is statistically significant at the
1% level. In three of these cases – access to safe water, access to sanitation, and
deforestation – they find that greater income equality has a favorable effect; in the other
three – carbon dioxide emissions, nitrogen depletion, and phosphorus depletion – they find
an adverse effect.
21

Scruggs divides emissions by national population to get a per capita measure. This too is problematic,
since environmental quality is a matter of ambient concentrations and exposures, rather than emissions per
capita. Higher emissions per capita in a sparsely populated country, where the emissions are widely
dispersed, may be less harmful than lower emissions per capita in a densely populated country. The data
presented by Scruggs (p. 273) indicate, for example, that per capita emissions of NOx and SOx are twice
and 5.5 times as high, respectively, in Canada as in Holland. This does not necessarily imply worse
environmental quality in Canada.
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Another curious feature of Scruggs’ model for the OECD countries is the inclusion of the percentage
contribution of nuclear power to the nation’s energy supply as a control variable. He finds that this variable
has a positive effect on his environmental quality index; as he notes, this may indicate a shift in the
composition of environmental costs rather than an overall reduction.
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Magnani (2000, p. 435) attributes this to the notion that “one’s subjective feeling of well-being is based
more on relative income than on absolute income,” inferring that this translates into a desire to improve
one’s relative expenditure on private goods. The plausibility of this inference presumably depends on the
distributional incidence of taxation for the provision of public goods.
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In sum, the limited international evidence that is now available provides empirical support
for the proposition that income inequality tends to exacerbate some types of air pollution
(notably smoke and sulfur dioxide), lack of access to clean drinking water and sanitation
facilities, and deforestation. In each of these cases, the political-economy effect – operating
via the impact of income distribution on the balance of power between winners and losers –
offers a plausible explanation. The contrary findings for carbon dioxide are not surprising,
since environmental impacts that are displaced onto other countries and future generations
are not as likely to generate domestic pressures for national-level policies to curb emissions
(Ansuategi and Escapa 2002). Other contrary findings – such as those for particulate air
pollution – are inconsistent with the effect expected on political-economy grounds.
Inconclusive findings are not surprising, given (i) the rather poor quality of international
data on income distribution;24 (ii) problems in the definition of environmental variables, the
quality of environmental data, and sample selection; (iii) the theoretical ambiguity with
respect to aggregation effects; and (iv) the possibility that income inequality simply is not a
very good proxy for power inequality.
8. Concluding remarks
Economic theory often treats market failure and government failure as impersonal,
exogenous phenomena to be remedied by disinterested public policy. This essay suggests
that the both the magnitude and incidence of environmental degradation and
environmental protection can instead be treated as endogenous phenomena, shaped by the
relative power of winners and losers. The mounting evidence that low-income
communities and people of color in the United States bear disproportionate
environmental burdens is consistent with the hypothesis that social decisions on
environmental protection systematically favor the more powerful over the less powerful.
The more limited evidence available on the impact of inequality on overall environmental
quality offers support for the hypothesis that greater inequality in the distribution of power
leads to lower levels of environmental protection and hence greater environmental
degradation.
There is much scope for further research on these issues. Among the potentially fruitful
avenues for future study are the following:
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•

the measurement of power and power inequality, including the identification of
relevant variables, alternative methods for aggregating these variables into
comprehensive measures, and tests of their robustness;

•

investigation of household-level relationships between income and environmental
impacts, a topic important not only for assessments of the distributional incidence

For example, for some countries the available data refer to income distribution, while for others they
refer to expenditure distribution. Measures of the latter generally show less inequality, since the
expenditure/income ratio tends to decline as household income rises.
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of environmental policies, but also for estimation of the “aggregation effect” of
income distribution on environmental quality;
•

exploration of differences among environmental variables, in terms of public
demand for (and opposition to) environmental protection and its marginal costs;

•

extension of environmental injustice research to include exposure to hazards
(rather than just the location of hazardous facilities) and the impacts on such
exposure on health, economic well-being, and other quality-of-life variables;

•

documentation of the links between power-related variables, specific
environmental policies, and specific environmental outcomes;

•

estimation of the net effect of inequality on the environmental quality experienced
by those who are relatively well-off, to assess whether more egalitarian
distributions of power and income might bring absolute gains in this dimension of
their well-being even at this end of the distributional spectrum; and

•

analysis of the complementarities and tradeoffs between intra-generational and
inter-generational equity, that is, between environmental justice and
sustainability.

While much remains to be done, the broad contours of a new vision of the relationship
between social justice and the environment are already visible. In the past two decades,
advocates of social justice have grown increasingly aware of the importance of
environmental protection, recognizing that the communities for whom they speak often
bear disproportionate environmental costs. At the same time, advocates of environmental
protection are beginning to recognize the importance of social justice: if inequality
exacerbates environmental degradation, then advances in environmental quality will
require movement toward a more democratic distribution of power and wealth.
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